Why Agreements with Putin Are Impossible Without Guarantees
The same principle applies in international politics. However, some politicians continue proposing agreements with Putin as if his promises alone could ensure security, compliance with international treaties, and protection of economic interests.
Practice demonstrates the opposite: Kremlin promises do not replace guarantees, and agreements without enforceable mechanisms do not prevent violations.
Let us review several historical facts.
Budapest Memorandum: Security Assurances to Ukraine
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited one of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world. Under pressure from the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom, Ukraine agreed to surrender its nuclear weapons and transfer nuclear warheads to Russia.
In 1994, Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom signed the Budapest Memorandum. Its signatories reaffirmed their commitment to respect the independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of Ukraine, and to refrain from the threat or use of force.
The memorandum did not provide for automatic military intervention by other states if Ukraine were attacked. Political assurances failed to prevent Russia from violating Ukrainian borders.
In 2014, Russia occupied Crimea and initiated armed aggression in Donbas, launching a full scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The state that signed a document promising to respect Ukrainian territorial integrity became the aggressor itself.
This experience highlights the difference between promises and guarantees: a signature on a document will not stop a violator unless supported by enforceable defense mechanisms.
Crimea and Donbas: Denial of Russian Military Involvement
In February 2014, Russian servicemen seized key government buildings in Crimea, blocked Ukrainian military units, and established Russian control over the peninsula. Meanwhile, Putin denied the involvement of Russian troops, presenting armed personnel as local "self defense" forces.
On April 17, 2014, Putin publicly admitted that Russian military personnel operated behind Crimean "self defense" units, stating they acted "decisively and professionally." Putin statement of April 17, 2014 directly contradicted his previous denials.
Russia subsequently used the results of a pseudo "referendum" held under military occupation to annex Crimea. The UN General Assembly in Resolution 68/262 affirmed the territorial integrity of Ukraine and urged states not to recognize any alteration of Crimea status.
In Donbas, Russian authorities denied troop presence and direct involvement, positioning Russia as a mediator rather than a combatant party. Nevertheless, Russian backed armed formations received continuous military aid and weaponry from Russia.
The Minsk agreements were intended to cease hostilities and stabilize the situation but failed to deliver lasting peace. In February 2015, the offensive against Debaltseve violated the ceasefire. European Union statement condemning the violation.
In March 2015, EU leaders linked the duration of sectoral economic sanctions against Russia to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements. Because the agreements were not fulfilled, sanctions were repeatedly extended. EU decision prolonging sanctions.
MH17: Denial and Findings of the International Investigation
On July 17, 2014, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was shot down over occupied eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 people on board.
Putin denied Russian responsibility for the tragedy. In May 2018, answering a question regarding the Russian origin of the missile, he stated: "No, of course. Of course, no."
The Joint Investigation Team established that the aircraft was downed by a "Buk" missile system transported from Russia to Ukraine. The system belonged to the 53rd Anti Aircraft Missile Brigade stationed in Kursk and was later returned to Russia. Findings of the Joint Investigation Team confirmed the Russian origin of the missile system.
In November 2022, a Dutch court convicted Igor Girkin, Sergey Dubinskiy, and Leonid Kharchenko in absentia, sentencing them to life imprisonment for their role in downing the plane. Court verdict on the MH17 case.
In February 2023, international investigators reported strong indications that the decision to supply the "Buk" system to Russian controlled forces was made at the level of Putin. Investigators analyzed intercepted phone calls and official documents, concluding that a request for heavy air defense systems was forwarded to Russian leadership and approved.
At that moment, available evidence was insufficient for new criminal prosecutions. The investigation exhausted available leads without cooperation from Russian authorities or additional witness statements. The investigation was suspended but not closed. Official statement by the Joint Investigation Team on February 8, 2023.
Denial of Invasion Plans Prior to February 2022
Ahead of February 24, 2022, Putin and Russian officials repeatedly denied any intention to attack Ukraine. Even while massing military forces along Ukrainian borders, the Kremlin dismissed warnings of an impending invasion.
In January 2022, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov stated that Russia had no plans to invade Ukraine. On February 15, Putin claimed a partial troop withdrawal was underway. On February 21, Russian leadership recognized proxy entities in occupied Donbas and ordered troop deployments into those territories.
Days later, Russia launched a full scale invasion of Ukraine. Official statements preceding the attack proved completely inconsistent with subsequent military actions. Timeline of Russian official rhetoric ahead of the invasion.
Business Redistribution in Russia Long Before 2022
Pressure on private enterprise and asset transfers favoring state entities or connected structures began long before the full scale invasion.
Yukos: Following state prosecution, key asset "Yuganskneftegaz" was acquired by state owned "Rosneft". Former shareholders pursued billions in compensation through international arbitration. Arbitration documents regarding Yukos case.
"Sakhalin-2": Under regulatory pressure, foreign shareholders Shell, Mitsui, and Mitsubishi ceded majority control to "Gazprom". Further details.
"Bashneft": Company shares were returned to state ownership by court ruling and subsequently acquired by "Rosneft".
Baring Vostok and "Vostochny" Bank: Founder Michael Calvey and colleagues faced criminal prosecution amid a shareholder dispute, criticized by observers as fabricated pressure.
"VKontakte": Founder Pavel Durov lost operational control of the platform, which transferred to state linked entities under Mail.ru Group.
These cases demonstrate that pressure on business owners and asset redistribution became structural features of the Russian economy long before 2022.
Foreign Corporations, Banks, and Automotive Brands
Following the full scale invasion, pressure on international business escalated. Russian authorities introduced so called temporary management over foreign assets, forcing foreign owners to surrender operational control or exit the market entirely.
Energy and Industry:
ExxonMobil: Lost operational participation in the "Sakhalin-1" project.
Fortum and Uniper: Russian assets placed under so called temporary management.
Food Industry and Retail:
Carlsberg and Danone: Russian subsidiaries seized under state control in 2023.
Nestlé and Auchan: In September 2026, assets were placed under so called temporary administration. Reuters reporting on corporate seizures.
Automotive Industry:
Renault, Nissan, Toyota, Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz, Ford, BMW, Hyundai, Kia, and Mazda lost their market presence. Companies sold manufacturing plants for nominal values, transferred operations, or ceased activity, with assets transitioning to state backed entities. Reuters summary on Western automaker assets in Russia.
Banking Sector:
Rosbank: French Société Générale surrendered control of its banking entity under state pressure.
HSBC Bank (RR): British HSBC handed over its local subsidiary to Expobank.
RN Bank: Joint venture involving UniCredit and Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi alliance transferred to "AvtoVAZ".
JPMorgan and Commerzbank: Russian court authorized asset seizures targeting local units. Court ruling details.
These represent selected instances among numerous foreign enterprises facing asset loss, property restrictions, or forced market exits. Foreign investors who relied on property rights and treaty commitments confronted an environment where established rules no longer operated.
Peace Agreements with Russia Must Rely on Enforceable Guarantees
These examples span diverse fields: national security, international law, conflict resolution, and economic investment. The overarching conclusion remains constant: Russian leadership repeatedly denied established facts, broke international commitments, and acted contrary to signed agreements.
Therefore, discussing agreements with Putin, whether regarding ceasefires, security guarantees for Ukraine, territorial integrity, or economic relations, cannot rely on political promises alone. Effective agreements require verifiable terms, independent monitoring, predetermined enforcement consequences, and binding security mechanisms.
Trust cannot substitute guarantees. When a state repeatedly breaks commitments, future treaties must address that track record rather than ignore it.
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